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Abstract. Contemporary Western attitudes concerning the management of natural re-
sources, treatment of nonhuman animals, and the natural world emerge from traditions
derived from Western European philosophy, i.e., they assume that humans are autonomous
from, and in control of, the natural world. A different approach is presented by Traditional
Ecological Knowledge (TEK) of indigenous peoples of North America. Although spiritually
oriented, TEK converges on Western scientific approaches. TEK is based on close obser-
vation of nature and natural phenomena; however, it is combined with a concept of com-
munity membership that differs from that of Western political and social thought. TEK is
strongly tied to specific physical localities; therefore, all aspects of the physical space can
be considered part of the community, including animals, plants, and landforms. As a con-
sequence, native worldviews can be considered to be spatially oriented, in contrast to the
temporal orientation of Western political and historical thought. TEK also emphasizes the
idea that individual plants and animals exist on their own terms. This sense of place and
concern for individuals leads to two basic TEK concepts: (1) all things are connected,
which is conceptually related to Western community ecology, and (2) all things are related,
which changes the emphasis from the human to the ecological community as the focus of
theories concerning nature. Connectedness and relatedness are involved in the clan systems
of many indigenous peoples, where nonhuman organisms are recognized as relatives whom
the humans are obliged to treat with respect and honor. Convergence of TEK and Western
science suggests that there may be areas in which TEK can contribute insights, or possibly
even new concepts, to Western science. TEK is inherently multidisciplinary in that it links
the human and the nonhuman, and is the basis not only for indigenous concepts of nature,
but also for concepts of indigenous politics and ethics. This multidisciplinary aspect sug-
gests that TEK may be useful in resolving conflicts involving a variety of stakeholders and
interest groups in controversies over natural resource use, animal rights, and conservation.
TEK may also have implications for human behavior and obligations toward other forms
of life that are often unrecognized, or at least not emphasized, in Western science. We
present examples from community and behavioral ecology where a TEK-based approach
yielded unexpected and nonintuitive insights into natural phenomena. Understanding of
TEK may be useful in helping scientists respond to the changing public perceptions of
science, and new cultural pressures in our society.
Key words: belief system; conservation; ecology; environment; Indian; indigenous; Native Amer-
ican; resource management; Traditional Ecological Knowledge.
Capitalism and communism are simply the opposite
sides of the same eurocentric coin. What the world
needs is not a choice between capitalism and com-
munism, between one aspect of eurocentrism or eu-
rosupremacism and another. What we need is a gen-
uine alternative to the European tradition as a whole.
—Russel Means, Lakota
(quoted in Churchill 1995)
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last 100 years there has been considerable
debate over the appropriate way in which Americans,
and other peoples, should treat the natural world (Le-
opold 1948, Dunlap 1988, Wilson 1992, Smith 1996).
Some advocate a pro-development extractive approach,
in which natural resources are perceived largely in
terms of their economic value to humans. This per-
spective dominated attitudes towards environmental is-
sues and resource management until the 1960s (Dunlap
1988) and is currently exemplified by the ‘‘wise-use’’
movement (Lehr 1992). This viewpoint has been iden-
tified with the political right (Smith 1996); however,
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exploitative approaches may come from all shades of
the political spectrum.
There also exist opposing models, which argue that
nature and nonhuman animals must be protected from
human interference, and that true conservation means
setting aside tracts of land from which human settle-
ments, and even humans themselves, may be excluded
(Brinkerhoff Jackson 1994, Owens 1998). For example,
the U.S. Wilderness Act of 1964 defines wilderness as
space forever untrammeled by man (Owens 1998). This
viewpoint has been identified with the political left
(Wilson 1992, Smith 1996), but as with pro-develop-
ment forces, ‘‘conservationists’’ are represented
throughout the political spectrum.
Despite apparent differences, all Western attitudes
toward nature come from the same European philo-
sophical roots, i.e., Descartes, Bacon, and the Enlight-
enment (Smith 1996). In the writings of philosophers
as different as Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant, it is as-
sumed that humans are autonomous from, and in con-
trol of, the natural world (Mayr 1997). For example,
John Locke (1952) argued that nature existed primarily
for facilitating the comfort and convenience of humans.
For our purposes, we assume the viewpoints we de-
scribe to be characteristic of the dominant cultures in
modern Europe, North America, and Japan, where a
large proportion of citizens live in industrialized so-
cieties in which nature is viewed as separate and ‘‘under
control’’ (Smith 1996). People across the political spec-
trum in these societies view the natural world as con-
sisting of ‘‘resources,’’ which carries the implicit as-
sumption that all of nature can be exploited, regardless
of whether it is for economic or aesthetic purposes
(e.g., Locke 1952). In addition, citizens of industrial-
ized societies typically adhere to the perspective that
nature can be defined as places that are separate from
humans (Leopold 1948, Smith 1996, Owens 1998).
Consequently, the problem is not lack of knowledge
for effectively managing resources, but rather moti-
vating humans to conserve (Anderson 1996).
We do not, however, review and analyze Western
attitudes toward nature, since this topic has been ex-
tensively treated elsewhere (Smith 1984, 1996, Mander
1991, Deloria 1992, 1995, Jackson 1994). Our intention
is instead to discuss the Traditional Ecological Knowl-
edge (henceforth TEK) of Native American peoples
(henceforth native), which we believe represents a third
alternative, sharing elements with both extractive and
conservationist approaches, yet remaining clearly dis-
tinct from both (Johannes 1989, Martinez 1994). We
emphasize the TEK of Native Americans because of
our personal experiences and knowledge, but acknowl-
edge that forms of TEK are found in indigenous peoples
throughout the world that share similar themes and ap-
proaches.
Some conservationists have contended that the ap-
proach they use is in the spirit of Native American or
indigenous traditions (Pierotti and Wildcat 1997a, b).
We argue that such associations are based upon false
assumptions about the true nature of indigenous belief
systems, because unlike Western philosophy, TEK as-
sumes that humans are, and always will be, connected
to the natural world, and that there is no such thing as
nature that exists independent of humans and their ac-
tivities (Deloria 1990, Pierotti and Wildcat 1997b,
Owens 1998).
The connections that are a crucial aspect of TEK are
based on a mixture of extraction, e.g., animals are taken
as prey, combined with recognition of the inherent val-
ue and good of nonhuman lives (sensu Taylor 1992).
Traditional knowledge is based on the premise that hu-
mans should not view themselves as responsible for
nature, i.e., we are not stewards of the natural world,
but instead that we are a part of that world, no greater
than any other part (Pierotti and Wildcat 1997b). In
this way TEK deals largely with motivating humans to
show respect for nonhumans. The respect for the non-
human inherent in TEK can constrain natural human
tendencies towards overexploitation, because nonhu-
mans are incorporated into the ritual representation of
the community, and are considered as members of the
community (Anderson 1996, Barsh 1997, Salmon
2000).
SPACE, TIME, AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
In recent years there has been considerable discus-
sion of differences between the worldviews and knowl-
edge base of indigenous peoples, and that of the ‘‘dom-
inant’’ or ‘‘Western’’ culture (e.g., Johannes 1989,
Mander 1991, Suzuki and Knudtson 1992, Anderson
1996). One major difference between native peoples of
North America and Western European immigrants to
North America is that the latter look backward and
forward in time to get a sense of their place in history,
while native peoples look around them to get a sense
of their place in history. This difference has been de-
scribed as thinking temporally in the case of Western
culture and as thinking spatially in the case of the native
peoples (Deloria 1992).
The idea of human history existing independently of
local places and the natural world is foreign to the
native peoples of North America, because for them
their history cannot be separated from the entire ge-
ography, biology, and environment to which they be-
long. ‘‘In the traditional (way of knowing), there is no
such thing as isolation from the rest of creation’’ (De-
loria 1990:17). The notion of thinking spatially can be
seen in the native tradition of invoking and praying to
the four horizontal directions, the sky, and the earth.
A person making such prayers is acknowledging the
space in which they live, and their understanding that
the creative forces that shape their lives exist in the
natural world that surrounds them in all of these di-
rections.
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We cannot and do not attempt to offer a definitive
treatment of all North American indigenous world-
views. The influence of local places upon cultures, and
the corresponding diversity of peoples attached to those
places, guarantees the existence of variation in the cer-
emonial and symbolic expressions of native world-
views. Our experience and research suggest, however,
that there may exist a shared way of thinking and con-
cept of community common to native peoples of North
America, which we define as TEK (see also Anderson
1996). Despite both forced and voluntary relocations,
native people have taken their TEK with them, which
has allowed them to survive these experiences, and
establish sacred places in their new homes (Owens
1998:164). This way of thought includes: (1) respect
for nonhuman entities as individuals, (2) the existence
of bonds between humans and nonhumans, including
incorporation of nonhumans into ethical codes of be-
havior, (3) the importance of local places, and (4) the
recognition of humans as part of the ecological system,
rather than as separate from and defining the existence
of that system.
Despite dislocations and forced removals, these ideas
are part of the shared intellectual property of all native
peoples we have studied and lived with during the last
10 years at Haskell Indian Nations University in
Lawrence, Kansas. We consider TEK to be an intel-
lectual foundation for an indigenous theory and prac-
tice of politics and ethics, centered on natural places
and connection to the natural world, which is capable
of generating a conservation ethic on the part of those
who follow its principles. TEK is based upon empirical
observations resulting from patient observation of the
natural world and its patterns. TEK is inherently mul-
tidisciplinary because it links the human and the non-
human, and is not only the basis for indigenous con-
cepts of nature but also for concepts of politics and
ethics. There are therefore no clearly defined bound-
aries between philosophy, history, sociology, biology,
and anthropology in indigenous thought.
In essence, TEK requires one to be native to a place
(see also Jackson 1994), and to live with nature (see
also Wilson 1992), in contrast to the dominant Western
worldview, which assumes humans live above, sepa-
rated, or in opposition to nature (Mander 1991, Suzuki
and Knudtson 1992, Anderson 1996). To live with the
geography and biology of your environment without
trying to alter it solely to meet human needs is our
concept of what it means to be native to a place. TEK
is expressed in the ability to experience a sense of place
while casting off the modern Western view that
‘‘space’’ exists to be conquered.
We emphasize that TEK is very different than the
comfortable and romantic image of the Rousseauian
‘‘noble savage.’’ Living with nature bears little rela-
tionship to such concepts as ‘‘love of nature,’’ ‘‘close-
ness to nature,’’ ‘‘communing with nature,’’ or ‘‘con-
servation of nature,’’ which are statements made by
Western conservationists (see below and Anderson
1996). Those who feel that it is within their direct
power to conserve nature typically also feel that they
are in control of nature, and that nature should be con-
served only insofar as it benefits humans, either eco-
nomically or spiritually (Smith 1984). Within a TEK-
based ethical system, nature exists on its own terms,
and individual nonhumans have their own reasons for
existence, independent of human interpretation. One
way to think about this is that those who desire to dance
with wolves must first learn to live with wolves as
members of their ecological and social community.
Living with nature requires people to rearrange the
customs and habits of their daily life. The origins of
TEK are based in the knowledge that native societies
existed under conditions of constant pressure on the
resources upon which they depended, and that a means
had to be found to convince communities and families
to economize with regard to their use of natural re-
sources (Anderson 1996). This ethic may have arisen
from early experiences of Native Americans, as they
realized that resources upon which they depended could
disappear forever, e.g., local disappearances of species
depended upon for food and other products may have
led to development of an ethically based system of
restraint with regard to hunting.
One such tactic involved representing sound ecolog-
ical management in strongly ethical (or religious)
terms, and developing a view of the environment that
stressed specific concrete bonds between nature and the
human community (Rappaport 1971, Deloria 1990, An-
derson 1996). The cultural diversity of Native Amer-
icans reflects their intimate ties to the land and the
biology of the places that they call home in specific
social codes and institutions, rather than in some misty
‘‘union with nature’’ (Anderson 1996). Thus, TEK en-
compasses both science and religion, in the sense that
religion is the ritual representation of the community,
and a device for sanctioning moral and ethical codes
(Durkheim 1961). ‘‘The task of the tribal religion. . . is
to determine the proper relationship that the people
must have with other living beings’’ (Deloria 1992).
In TEK, we suggest that religion embodies environ-
mental knowledge; therefore, it is not surprising that
TEK is based on and has considerable insight into the
workings of nature, and in many ways converges close-
ly upon the Western science of ecology.
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND ECOLOGICAL
CONCEPTS
Native peoples lack an immigrant experience within
their memories (Deloria 1995). Native stories do not
deal with the exact time when events happened, since
they happened so long ago that they exist ‘‘on the other
side of memory’’ (Marshall 1995:207). The worldviews
and cultures of Native American peoples evolved in
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the environments of the continents of North and South
America. Native peoples depended upon the animals
and plants of these environments for food, clothing,
shelter, and companionship, and as a result developed
strong ties to these nonhuman lives. ‘‘Little empha-
sized, but equally as important for the formation of
(Native) personality was the group of other forms of
life which had come down over the centuries as part
of the larger family’’ (Deloria 1990:16–17). As these
places and beings existed and changed along with them
for thousands of years, native peoples developed their
sense of place that led them to think spatially, along
with their flexible knowledge base. These values have
been kept intact through TEK, regardless of whether
the people have been forced off their original lands,
either by changing ecological conditions or by Euro-
pean immigrants (Owens 1998).
The body of knowledge acquired through careful ob-
servation came to constitute much of what Native
Americans regard as TEK. One major theme of TEK
is that all things are connected, which is not simply a
homily or a romanticized cliche, but instead is a re-
alization that no single organism can exist without the
web of other life forms that surround it and make its
existence possible. This concept is closely related con-
ceptually to the Western discipline of community ecol-
ogy, and like community ecology, it places emphasis
on interrelationships between different species and in-
dividuals, and describes these interactions by employ-
ing the metaphor of a web. TEK also shares concepts
based on connectedness with physiological and bio-
chemical science related to the ecological concept of
nutrient cycles (Pierotti and Wildcat 1997b). Thus, al-
though the idea of a cycle, or circle, of life is an integral
part of Native spiritual beliefs, this is not a mystical
concept based upon great mysteries, but a practical
recognition of the fact that all living things are literally
connected to one another.
As a result of these connections with the nonhuman
world, native peoples do not think of nature as ‘‘wil-
derness,’’ but as home. Natives do not leave their
‘‘house’’ to ‘‘go into nature,’’ but instead feel that when
they leave their shelter and encounter nonhumans and
natural physical features that they are just moving into
other parts of their home (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1996).
‘‘What we call nature is conceived by Native peoples
as an extension of biological man, and therefore a (Na-
tive) never feels ‘surrounded by nature.’ A (Native)
walking in the forest, or paddling a canoe is not in
nature, but he is entirely surrounded by cultural mean-
ings his tradition has given to his external surround-
ings’’ (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1996:8–9). Thus, nonhuman
elements are incorporated into the ritual representation
of the community, establishing a nature-centered belief
system (see above). At its roots, Western ecology em-
ploys a similar concept since the word ‘‘ecology’’
comes from ‘‘oikos,’’ the Greek word for house, there-
by acknowledging nature as the house of the human
species.
Within TEK the shared ideas of connectedness and
nature as home have profound implications for native
conceptions of politics and ethics. Unlike dominant
Western political and ethical paradigms, which find
knowledge of how human beings ought to act imbedded
in the life of one’s social, i.e., human, relationships,
native peoples found within TEK instructions con-
cerning how a person should behave as a member of
a community consisting of many nonhuman persons,
e.g., four-leggeds, winged-ones, plants, and even land-
forms (Deloria 1990, 1992, Pierotti and Wildcat
1997b).
Western thought has traditionally followed the lead
of Aristotle, and defined politics and ethics as exclu-
sively human realms. Aristotle proposed that human
values are learned from our fellow community mem-
bers. From the perspective of TEK, Aristotle’s basic
reasoning was right, but his notion of community mem-
bership was wrong. TEK defines politics and ethics as
existing in the realm of ecosystems, and would argue
that it makes no sense to limit the notion of politics
and ethics only to human beings (see also Salmon
2000). By limiting the definition of ‘‘persons’’ to hu-
man beings, however, Aristotle created a false and nar-
row sense of community and the corresponding spheres
of political and moral life.
The inclusion of other living beings and natural ob-
jects into the category of persons, which includes hu-
man beings, requires politics and ethics that include
these other community members. Consideration of non-
human entities, including landforms, plants, and ani-
mals as individual persons who are part of their com-
munities operates to keep humans attending to the spe-
cific entity and its particular value (Taylor 1992). This
emphasis on individuality (see below) provides a spir-
itual alternative to overgeneralizing about nonhumans
(Anderson 1996). One illustration of how native peo-
ples include many other natural objects and living be-
ings as members of their community is found in clan
names and totems, which indicate covenants between
certain human families and specific animals (Deloria
1990). These animals are connected to families over
prolonged periods of time, and offer their assistance
and guidance during each generation of humans.
Throughout Native American cultures, there is a broad
commonality of beliefs about animals in which human
and nonhuman are bonded closely and part of one com-
munity involved with one another in terms of empow-
erment and emotional interactions (Anderson 1996).
It is frustrating to Native Americans to hear others
speak romantically of our closeness to nature or love
of nature. This relationship is more profound than most
people can imagine, and the implications of this rela-
tionship carry uncomfortable consequences. To be Ea-
gle, Wolf, Bear, Deer, or even Wasp clan means that
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you are kin to these other persons; they are your re-
lations. Ecological connectedness is culturally and cer-
emonially acknowledged through clan names, totems,
and ceremonies. In nearly all native stories animal- and
plant-persons existed before human-persons (Pierotti
and Wildcat 1997a). Thus, these kin exist as our elders
and, much as do human elders, function as our teachers
and as respected members of our community. Acknowl-
edging nonhumans as teachers and elders requires that
we pay careful attention to their lives, and recognize
that these lives have meaning on their own terms (see
also Taylor 1992).
This recognition of the value of nonhuman lives ex-
tends the social world to include animals as well as
humans, and led to an ethical system that required prop-
er treatment of the nonhuman. Humans live in mutual
aid relationships with the nonhumans. If humans eat
or otherwise use nonhumans, they are empowered by
that relationship, which leads to mutual respect (An-
derson 1996). Many nonhumans had powers far beyond
the capabilities of ordinary humans, and were able to
move with ease through worlds impassable to humans,
e.g., air, water. Since animals were persons, and as-
sumed to have some cognitive abilities, they were also
assumed to recognize the danger when they were being
hunted by humans. Thus if they were caught, it was
also assumed to involve some element of choice on
their part (Anderson 1996), hence the concept of the
prey ‘‘giving itself to you.’’ This presumed gift re-
quired gratitude (thanks), as well as respectful treat-
ment of the nonhuman remains on the part of the human
who took the life of the nonhuman (see also Tanner
1979).
The relationships of native peoples to nature have
often been described in terms like ‘‘harmony with na-
ture.’’ Such descriptions project a rather amorphous,
sentimental, and romanticized character to this rela-
tionship, but overlook the empirical knowledge of the
lives of plants and animals that was such a major com-
ponent of the daily lives of native peoples. The attitudes
and relationships of native people to other organisms
result from having evolved as distinct cultures in strong
association with those other creatures, and experienc-
ing them on a daily basis.
To native peoples, ecology and religion are insepa-
rable, and thus religion serves to code ecological
knowledge (Rappaport 1971, Deloria 1992, Anderson
1996). This religion then provides direct emotional in-
volvement with the nonhuman world. For example,
Northwest Coast Indians treated nonhuman beings with
a combination of a sense of direct personal empow-
erment, and a healthy respect or even fear (Anderson
1996:66). To these peoples, ‘‘Fish, bears, wolves, and
eagles were part of the kinship system, part of the com-
munity, part of the family structure. Modern urbanite
ecologists see these as Other, and romanticize them,
but for a Northwest Coast Indian, an alien human was
more Other than a local octopus or wolf’’ (Anderson
1996:66).
Adherents to TEK also recognize that animals ex-
isted before humans did. In Rock Cree cosmogony,
animals were recognized to have existed before human
beings, and humans were known to come from animals
during the progression of the earth (Brightman 1993).
Thus, adherents to TEK are untroubled by the idea that
humans came from nonhuman organisms. ‘‘Sungman-
itu Tanka Oyate, (wolves), were a nation long before
human beings realized and declared themselves a na-
tion’’ (Manuel Iron Cloud [Oglala Lakota] in McIntyre
1995). Recognition of this similarity and connection
between human and nonhumans leads also to the TEK
concept that all things are related, a concept that is less
than 150 years old in Western thought. Darwin’s (1859)
demonstration that humans must have evolved from
nonhuman ancestors was such a revolutionary concept
because it ran counter to prevailing Western philoso-
phy, from Aristotle to Kant. Perhaps the most important
consequence of Charles Darwin’s theory of common
descent was its change in the position of humans from
separate from nature to part of nature (Mayr 1997:182).
Darwin’s accomplishment served to establish in West-
ern thought one of the long-standing tenets of TEK,
i.e., humans are related to nonhumans and irrevocably
connected to the natural world.
One aspect of TEK often unrecognized is the em-
phasis that not only are humans dependent upon the
nonhuman, but also that the reverse is often true. Ac-
tivities of humans are often important in shaping the
lives and ecology of the nonhuman. Burning practices
of the indigenous peoples of both North America and
Australia have major effects on local community struc-
ture and lead both to increased biodiversity and in-
creased population size of many important species
(Lewis 1989). In contrast, both Western science and
popular culture have considered ‘‘wildfires’’ to be both
‘‘highly disruptive and environmentally destructive,’’
and only very recently has Western science come to
realize the value of fire as both an important component
of community ecology and as a management tool.
It is also important to emphasize that TEK leads its
adherents to identify with predators (Tanner 1979, Bull-
er 1983, Brightman 1993, Marshall-Thomas 1994,
Marshall 1995), which means they recognize that they
must take lives in order to live themselves. Native peo-
ple also recognize that they may be potential prey for
other large carnivores, which is opposed to the pre-
vailing idea in Western culture that any predator that
takes a human life must be killed as if it were a criminal.
This knowledge of connectedness and ecological sim-
ilarity allows native people to respect predators, since
they know how difficult it is to take the lives of other
individuals (Tanner 1979). It is also recognized that
predation is not a hostile act, and that nonhuman pred-
ators may feel strongly connected to the prey when
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they have taken its life (Marshall-Thomas 1994; R.
Pierotti, unpublished observations).
All predators were respected for their strength and
their weapons, but one predator spoke particularly to
many native peoples, e.g., Comanche, Shoshone (Bull-
er 1983), Blackfeet, Lakota (Marshall 1995, McIntyre
1995), and Northwest coastal tribes (Anderson 1996).
This was wolf, Canis lupus, who was found throughout
North America, lived in family groups, and was not
strong or swift enough to kill large prey alone. Wolves
working cooperatively as a group, however, could bring
down even large plant eaters. Their weapons were ‘‘for-
midable, but the first people saw that they were of little
use without endurance, patience and persever-
ance. . . qualities the first peoples could develop in
themselves’’ (Marshall 1995:6). More important, how-
ever, was that if people were to emulate the wolf, they
also had to exist to serve the environment, and to accept
the connectedness of life. ‘‘Understanding this reality
made them truly of the earth, because every life ulti-
mately gives itself back to the earth’’ (Marshall 1995:
6–7). Western scientists studying wolves have realized
that native people have far greater knowledge of the
behavior and ecology of wolves than Western science,
and have turned to native people to help them in their
study of these animals. For example, an Alaskan wolf
biologist has described the difficulty he had in locating
active dens until he turned to local Inupiaq hunters for
help (Stephenson 1982).
As in this last example, employment of TEK and its
emphasis on connectedness between organisms can re-
veal connections between species unknown to, or un-
recognized by ecologists. For example, during a study
of beluga whales, Delphinapterus leucas, in the Bering
Sea, it was noted that beluga no longer entered certain
rivers. The indigenous people attributed this to the
presence of beavers, which confused ecologists in-
volved in the study until it was explained that beaver
build dams in streams where salmon spawn, and that
since salmon no longer used these rivers, the beluga,
which fed upon the salmon, had ceased to use these
rivers (Huntington and Myrmin 1996).
Another example comes from the TEK-based idea
that badger and coyote were ‘‘friends’’ and hunted to-
gether. Western ecology, driven by the idea that com-
petition among species drives community dynamics,
categorized the relationship between coyote and badger
as competition between these two predators (Minta et
al. 1992). Recent study, however, revealed the empir-
ical basis of this story. Coyotes and badgers wander
around together, but when they see a squirrel, coyote
gives chase. If the squirrel goes into a burrow, badger
will dig up the burrow, or both will dig together. If the
squirrel stays in the burrow, badger will often get it
and have a meal. If the squirrel leaves by another bur-
row exit, coyote often gets it and has a meal. Food is
not shared, but both coyote and badger catch more
squirrels when they hunt together than when they hunt
alone (Minta et al. 1992).
Our own research (R. Pierotti) into foraging asso-
ciations between marine birds and mammals was in-
fluenced by the native idea that mixed species animal
groups actually forage cooperatively, rather than com-
petitively (Pierotti 1988a, b). The relationship between
foraging marine mammals and associated gulls (Larus)
was assumed to be competition, or at best commen-
salism in the Western scientific literature. However, we
found that sea lions, dolphins, and even large whales
use the conspicuous gulls to locate rich concentrations
of patchily distributed fish and squid. The foraging ac-
tivities of the mammals then serve to concentrate the
prey at the surface, where the prey is much more ac-
cessible to the gulls, and as in the badger–coyote ex-
ample, both groups experience a higher rate of feeding
success as a result of their cooperation.
Similarly, the idea of an intergenerational conflict
between adults and juveniles of the same species over
care of unrelated offspring by nonrelatives (Pierotti
1988, 1991) was a result of traditional training that
stressed recognizing the importance of individuals. The
accepted scientific view of this ‘‘alloparental care’’ was
that it was a result of either errors on the part of adults,
or of kin selection (Riedman 1982). In contrast, by
identifying and following individuals of both genera-
tions this conflict was recognized as a complex inter-
action between juveniles and adults. The juveniles
sought adequate parental care, even from nonrelatives.
Adults, depending upon specific ecological conditions,
either (1) readily provided such care, or (2) did not
give care when they could avoid it. The outcome of
these behavioral interactions varied between years,
even for the same individuals, and could not be simply
predicted based upon genetic or other deterministic
models.
CONCLUSIONS
TEK is a constantly evolving way of thinking about
the world. Although views covered by TEK are de-
scribed as ‘‘traditional,’’ this should not be taken to
mean that they cannot change. The essence of tradi-
tional beliefs is that they have existed long enough for
long-range consequences to affect them (Anderson
1996). Use of the term traditional implies the repetition
of a fixed body of data. Each generation, however,
makes observations, compares their experiences with
what they have been taught, and conducts experiments
to test the reliability of their knowledge (Barsh 1997).
TEK is linked to long-range consequences of human
action and environmental change; therefore adherents
to TEK should always be able to modify their activities
and responses if environmental conditions so demand.
This reliance on new information as local conditions
change reinforces the spatial orientation of TEK, in
contrast to the temporal orientation of Western ethical
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systems (Deloria 1992). The spatial orientation of na-
tive peoples leads them to recognize that there are al-
ways new experiences and knowledge in the world, and
transmission of TEK by oral traditions allows them to
adjust in response to changing conditions. As a result,
ethical and moral instructions for living are fit to the
current ecological and historical context. In contrast,
Western ethical behavior is derived from unchanging
ideas (written words) that are thousands of years old,
e.g., ancient Greek philosophers, the Bible, or the Ko-
ran. While these concepts may have been of crucial
importance when they were first written down, they
may be of little relevance to current ecological and
social conditions. TEK derives from the physical, bi-
ological, and spiritual environment that is part of daily
life (Deloria 1992), and the knowledge and experience
gained through daily interaction with that environment.
In TEK, the Western dichotomies of natural vs. super-
natural, physical vs. metaphysical, sacred and profane,
nature vs. nurture become largely meaningless. Ex-
perience, which emerges from local places, is the basis
of both science and spirituality.
What will be gained by placing TEK-based world-
views into a broad-based system of knowledge is the
ability to access a large amount of information and
experience that has been previously ignored, or treated
as mysticism. This additional knowledge, with its em-
pirically derived emphasis on the natural world, can
provide us with scientifically testable insights into
some of the most pressing problems facing humankind
today. The multidisciplinary structure inherent in TEK
should make it relatively easy for knowledge and in-
sights gained through TEK to be communicated among
members of different disciplines, leading various stake-
holders to negotiate more effectively with one another
through a shared conceptual framework. As one West-
ern scientist has put it ‘‘Imagine people who confi-
dently assume they can best describe and manage the
natural resources of an unfamiliar region alone—ig-
noring local hunters who know every cave and water-
hole and the movements and behavior of a host of local
species. Such, historically, has been the custom of most
scientists and natural resource managers working in
unfamiliar environments’’ (Johannes 1989:5).
To emphasize this point, we would like to close by
relating an experience we are sure we share with many
biologists, i.e., being asked ‘‘What good is the work
that you do?’’ This question contains the hidden as-
sumption that if what we do does not directly benefit
human beings in some way it is without value. We often
answer that our work teaches us more about the other
members of our community and how to live with them,
but most people of Western heritage appear confused
by this answer, and do not understand this point. In
contrast, if we give this answer to Native American
elders, they are completely satisfied, for they under-
stand implicitly what we are trying to accomplish, and
its significance to humans.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank the faculty and students of Haskell Indian Nations
University for the knowledge and ideas that they have shared
with us. We thank C. Annett, J. Ford, D. Martinez, M. Wild-
cat, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on drafts
of this manuscript. This work was supported in part by NSF
grant no. DEB-9317582 to R. Pierotti.
LITERATURE CITED
Anderson, E. N. 1996. Ecologies of the heart: emotion, belief,
and the environment. Oxford University Press, New York,
New York, USA.
Barsh, R. L. 1997. Forests, indigenous peoples, and biodi-
versity. Global Biodiversity (Canadian Museum of Nature)
7(2):20–24.
Brightman, R. 1993. Grateful prey: Rock Cree human–animal
relationships. University of California Press, Berkeley, Cal-
ifornia, USA.
Brinkerhoff Jackson, J. 1994. A sense of place, a sense of
time. Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut,
USA.
Buller, G. 1983. Comanche and coyote, the culture maker.
Pages 245–258 in B. Swann, editor. Smoothing the ground.
University of California Press, Berkeley, California, USA.
Churchill, W. 1995. Since predator came: notes from the
struggle for American Indian liberation. Aigis Publications,
Littleton, Colorado, USA.
Darwin, C. 1859. The origin of species by means of natural
selection. Studio Editions, London, UK.
Deloria, V., Jr. 1990. Knowing and understanding: traditional
education in the modern world. Winds of Change 5(1):12–
18.
Deloria, V., Jr. 1992. God is red: a native view of religion.
Second edition. North American Press, Golden, Colorado,
USA.
Deloria, V., Jr. 1995. Red earth, white lies. Harper and Row,
New York, New York, USA.
Dunlap, T. 1988. Saving America’s wildlife. Princeton Uni-
versity Press, Princeton, New Jersey, USA.
Durkheim, E. 1961. The elementary forms of the religious
life. Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, USA.
Huntington, H. P., and N. I. Myrmin. 1996. Traditional eco-
logical knowledge of beluga whales: an indigenous knowl-
edge pilot project in the Chukchi and northern Bering Seas.
Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Anchorage, Alaska, USA.
Jackson, W. 1994. Becoming native to this place. University
of Kentucky Press, Lexington, Kentucky, USA.
Johannes, R. E. 1989. Traditional ecological knowledge: a
collection of essays. IUCN, Cambridge, UK.
Lehr, J., editor. 1992. Rational readings on environmental
issues. Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, New York,
USA.
Leopold, A. 1948. A Sand County almanac. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, UK.
Lewis, H. T. 1989. A parable of fire: hunter gatherers in
Canada and Australia. Pages 7–20 in R. E. Johannes, editor.
Traditional ecological knowledge: a collection of essays.
IUCN, Cambridge, UK.
Locke, J. 1952 (reprint of 1690). Second treatise of govern-
ment. Bobbs-Merril, Indianapolis, Indiana, USA.
Mander, J. 1991. The absence of the sacred. Sierra Club
Books, San Francisco, California, USA.
Marshall, Joseph, III. 1995. On behalf of the wolf and the
First Peoples. Red Crane Books, Santa Fe, New Mexico,
USA.
Marshall-Thomas, E. 1994. The tribe of tiger: cats and their
culture. Simon and Schuster, New York, New York, USA.
1340 INVITED FEATURE Ecological Applications
Vol. 10, No. 5
Martinez, D. 1994. Traditional environmental knowledge
connects land and culture. Winds of Change 9(4):89–94.
Mayr, E. 1997. This is biology: the science of the living
world. Belknap Press, London, UK.
McIntyre, R. 1995. War against the wolf: America’s cam-
paign to exterminate the wolf. Voyageur Press, Stillwater,
Minnesota, USA.
Minta, S. C., K. A. Minta, and D. F. Lott. 1992. Hunting
associations between badgers and coyotes. Journal of Mam-
malogy 73:814–820.
Owens, L. 1998. Mixed-blood messages: literature, film, fam-
ily, place. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman,
Oklahoma, USA.
Pierotti, R. 1988a. Associations between marine birds and
marine mammals in the Northwest Atlantic. Pages 31–58
in J. Burger, editor. Seabirds and other marine vertebrates:
commensalism, competition, and predation. Columbia Uni-
versity Press, New York, New York, USA.
Pierotti, R. 1988b. Interactions between gulls and otariid pin-
nipeds: competition, commensalism, and cooperation. Pag-
es 213–239 in J. Burger, editor. Seabirds and other marine
vertebrates: commensalism, competition, and predation.
Columbia University Press, New York, New York, USA.
Pierotti, R. 1989. Intergenerational conflicts in species of
birds with precocial offspring. Proceedings International
Ornithological Congress. 19:1024–1029
Pierotti, R. 1991. Adoption vs. infanticide: an intergenera-
tional conflict in birds and mammals. American Naturalist
138:1140–1158.
Pierotti, R., and D. Wildcat. 1997a. Evolution, creation, and
native traditions. Winds of Change 12:(2)73–77.
Pierotti, R., and D. Wildcat 1997b. The science of ecology
and Native American traditions. Winds of Change 12(4):
94–98.
Rappaport, R. A. 1971. The sacred in human evolution. An-
nual Review of Ecology and Systematics 2:23–44.
Reichel-Dolmatoff, G. 1996. The forest within: the world
view of the Tukano Amazonian Indians. Council Oak
Books, Tulsa, Oklahoma, USA.
Riedman, M. L. 1982. The evolution of alloparental care and
adoption in mammals and birds. Quarterly Review of Bi-
ology 57:405–435.
Salmón, E. 2000. Kincentric ecology: indigenous perceptions
of the human–nature relationship. Ecological Applications
10:1327–1332.
Smith, N. 1984. Uneven development: nature, capital, and
the production of space. Oxford University Press, Oxford,
UK.
Smith, N. 1996. The production of nature. Pages 35–54 in
G. Robertson, editor. FutureNatural: nature, science, cul-
ture. Routledge Press, New York, New York, USA.
Stephenson, R. O. 1982. Nunamiut Eskimos, wildlife biol-
ogists, and wolves. Pages 434–439 in F. H. Harrington and
P. C. Pacquet, editors. Wolves of the world. Noyes Park
Ridge, New Jersey, USA.
Suzuki, D., and P. Knudtson. 1992. Wisdom of the elders:
sacred native stories of nature. Bantam Books, New York,
New York, USA.
Tanner, A. 1979. Bringing home animals. C. Hurst and Com-
pany, London, UK.
Taylor, P. 1992. Respect for nature. Princeton University
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, USA.
Wilson, A. 1992. The culture of nature: North American land-
scape from Disney to the Exxon Valdez. Blackwell, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, USA.
